The Decline
and Fall of the AT&T empire
— Marketing Myopia Revisited
by James T. Berger, 11 March 2005
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It’s hard to imagine a more perfect marketing
machine than was AT&T before the 1984 divestiture. This company
virtually owned local telephone service in the United States with
approximately a 90 percent market share. Its Long Lines division
dominated long distance service. Its manufacturing arm — Western
Electric — was an industrial giant that produced all the telephone
and central office switching equipment the operating divisions needed,
and its research and development arm, Bell Labs, was world renowned.
Perhaps it was the immense concentration of business
power that led the U.S. Justice Department to initiate anti-monopoly
action against AT&T. The case dragged on for a decade and ended
with a consent decree that broke up AT&T. Essentially the local
telephone companies were spun off and became independent corporations.
There were seven of them and they became known as the “seven
sisters.” AT&T kept the lucrative Long Lines division
while Western Electric and Bell Labs later were spun off to become
Lucent Technologies.
The “smart money” on Wall Street at first
thought AT&T had great potential in an unregulated environment,
but problems immediately started to appear. As Ted Levitt pointed
out in his famous “Marketing Myopia” article, the reason
why growth slows or stopped is usually from a failure in management.
These fissures in AT&T were a function of in-grown management
and technological innovation. AT&T never had to do business
as an unregulated monopoly. It was a totally new business environment
for the company’s “Ma Bell” management.
As the years went on, massive changes started taking
place in AT&T’s marketing and business model. Competition
entered the long distance business and prices fell to the point
this AT&T jewel became essentially a commodity. Then, the cellular
business took off and AT&T was essentially a day and a dollar
short before it finally got into it.. Computer-related ventures
such as the acquisitions of Olivetti and National Cash Register
werte busts and resulted in large write-offs.
Throughout this process, the only AT&T profit
center that remained was its business telephone service and networking,
and this, too, dissolved when SBC dealt the death knell to the once
magnificent AT&T.
Realizing AT&T’s death was imminent unless
a visionary could come up with a Big Idea, AT&T brought in C.
Michael Armstrong to run the company. An outsider, Armstrong formerly
was CEO of Hughes Electronics Corporation and spent 31 years with
IBM rising to senior vice president and chairman of the board of
IBM World Trade Corporation.
Armstrong saw AT&T’s future back in local
telephone service. He envisioned a system where customers would
use AT&T as a single source supplier of local, long distance,
cable, wireless and broad band services. The key to the strategy
was to use Cable TV as the point of entry into the home. So, AT&T,
at premium prices, acquired a number of leading cable companies.
The technology involved installing a “box” in the homes
of cable subscribers that would enable them to access local and
long-distance telephone service as well as high-speed Internet services.
Unfortunately, the financial markets and the AT&T’s
lenders gave AT&T and Armstrong a short leash. The conversion
from cable to local telephone took longer than expected and the
costs were higher than expected. Because AT&T paid such a premium
for the cable networks, it became squeezed financially and had to
spin off assets like AT&T Wireless and finally, they threw in
the towel and sold off the cable operations principally to Comcast.
The only thing left was the business telephone profit
center and long distance, which SBC purchased in early February.
If Theodore Levitt were to update “Marketing
Myopia,” the late AT&T would deserve a prominent place.
_____
Author
James T. Berger, Managing Editor of The Wiglaf Journal. Early in
his career, Berger worked for Illinois Bell Telephone Co., which
was part of the old Bell System. He also teaches courses in strategic
marketing at Northwestern University and Roosevelt University. Feel
free to call him at (847) 328-9633 or e-mail him at j-berger@northwestern.edu
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